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Abstract
The resident matching algorithm, Gale-Shapley, currently used by SF Match
and the National Residency Match Program, has been in use for over 50
years without fundamental alteration. The algorithm is a stable-marriage
method that favors applicant outcomes. However, in these 50 years, there
has been a big shift in the supply and demand of applicants and programs.
These changes along with the way the Match is implemented have induced a
costly race among applicants to apply and interview at as many programs as
possible. Meanwhile programs also incur high costs as they maximize their
probability of matching by interviewing as many candidates as possible.
Keywords: resident matching, game theory, Nash equilibrium, Bayesian
Nash equilibrium
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1. Introduction
The tech report is organized as follows: Section 2 Background, Section 4
Resident matching with no costs, Section 5 Resident matching with costs.
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2. Background
Residency matching connects graduating medical students with residency
programs as they pursue further medical training and specialization. Each
year, over 43,000 US and international graduates apply for 31,000 residency
positions. Unique to medicine, a probabilistic algorithm determines the fate
of graduating students.
The residency matching algorithm has evolved over time. The first resi-
dency programs, then called internships, were introduced in the 1920s as op-
tional postgraduate training. These programs initially attracted only a few
medical graduates, who wished to gain more exposure to clinical medicine.
The inadequate supply of interns led to fierce competition among the pro-
grams, which manifested as a race between programs to secure binding com-
mitments from potential graduates as early as possible [8]. This resulted in
medical students receiving internship offers up to two years before graduation
[11]. This process not only disrupted the last two years of medical school, but
was suboptimal on both sides. Students often had to accept or reject offers
without having heard back from all programs, to which they applied, includ-
ing potentially more preferred ones. Programs had incomplete information
and little medical school performance to judge applicant qualifications when
extending offers this early.
To counter this, Turner proposed and the medical schools agreed in 1945
to not release transcripts nor give letters of recommendation until a later date.
However, this did not fundamentally change the process, but simply pushed
back the process until the last year of medical school. The programs and
applicants still played the same adversarial game, but on a shorter time scale.
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The programs made time-limited offers, while the students delayed accepting
until hearing back from more preferred programs. This led programs to
steadily decrease the offer time limits to reduce the risk of their preferred
candidates successfully waiting and accepting alternate offers. So from an
initially agreed offer time limit of 10 days in 1945, the programs decreased it
to less than 12 hours in 1950 [10].
In order to avoid this race to the bottom between programs, the National
Interassociation Committee on Internships (NICI) was formed in 1950 to ex-
amine existing matching plans and perform a trial run for a centralized match
system. Then in October 1951, 79 medical schools formed the National Stu-
dent Internship Committee (NSIC) and decided to adopt the Boston Pool
Plan [6] nationally upon the recommendations of the National Interassocia-
tion Committee on Internships (NICI). This method was modified to be more
equitable to applicants, and then first used nationally in April 1952 [7]. The
National Internship Matching Program (NIMP), now the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP), was incorporated on Jan 7, 1953, to manage
and administer the matching process.
The NRMP algorithm saw only minor changes from 1952 until 1997 [4].
It was a stable-marriage algorithm with the programs being the proposing
side. Then in 1997, after a year of preliminary study [1], the NRMP decided
to adopt an applicant-proposing version of the old algorithm [9]. In ophthal-
mology, the match process is administered by SF Match, which has used an
applicant proposing stable-marriage algorithm since 1977.
In the following section, we discuss the matching algorithms in more detail
to better understand their strengths and weaknesses.
3
3. Matching Algorithms
3.1. Boston Pool Plan
The initial NIMP algorithm matched the applicants to programs accord-
ing to the confidential ranked lists submitted by all participants [6]. The
applicants rank all the programs they would be willing to attend in ascend-
ing ordinal order, with 1 being most preferred. The programs group the
applicants by tiers and then rank within tiers. For example, if a program
had n available positions, its first choice applicants would be tier 1 and ranked
within tier from one to n, and its next tier students would be ranked n+1
to 2n, and so on. The algorithm starts by matching students and programs
that each other 1 or most preferred. Then, the programs, which had not
filled their positions, would be matched with students in their second tier,
but who had ranked the programs 1. If still unfilled, the programs would be
next matched with applicants in their second tier and who had ranked the
programs 2. The process continues iteratively and the can be represented
as paired ranks in the following order [(1,1), (2,1), (1,2), (2,2), (3,1), (3, 2),
(1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 3), ], where the ordered rank pair is the program tier and
student rank respectively.
Immediately after this initial NIMP algorithm was proposed, objections
arose as students showed that it might penalize highly qualified students. For
example, suppose an applicant did not match his first choice, and his second
choice program had ranked him in the first tier. However, given the order
of the matching, his second choice program might already have filled all its
positions with candidates in its second tier. This leads to a situation where
both the applicant and the program prefer each other, but are not matched,
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and is an example of an unstable match.
3.2. Stable-Marriage Algorithm
The final adopted NIMP algorithm was modified to avoid these types of
situations by using deferred matching [7]. It is a stable-marriage algorithm,
and is mathematically equivalent to the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which won
the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2012.
The canonical stable-marriage algorithm finds stable matches between a
group of n men and a group of n women, that have ranked each other in
terms of preference. A match is stable when for a match tuple of man and
woman, denoted (A, B):
1. there is no woman D that man A prefers, and who also prefers A to
her current match
2. there is no man C that woman B prefers, and who also prefers B to his
current match
Alternatively a match (A, B) is not stable if:
1. there is a woman D that man A prefers, and who also prefers A to her
current match
2. Or there is man C that woman B prefers, and who also prefers B to his
current match
The stable-marriage problem applies not only to matching men and women,
but to many other two-sided stable matching problems. The resident match-
ing problem can be reworded as a stable marriage problem with the applicants
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as one side and the residency programs the other. The only difference is that
residency programs can match as many applicants as they have residency
positions.
For an equal number of participants on each side, who have ranked every
potential partner, it was proved by Gale and Shapley that a stable match
women exist [3], and their eponymous algorithm finds a stable solution. Gale
and Shapley had originally applied their algorithm to matching colleges with
students, but this is mathematically equivalent to matching programs with
medical students.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm takes as input the rank lists of all the par-
ticipants along with a proposing side. Without loss of generality, assume
for the following discussion that programs are the proposing side. Then the
algorithm first selects a program at random from the pool of programs with
unfilled positions. The program will first propose to its most preferred can-
didate according to its rank list. If that candidate is unmatched, then a
tentative match is formed with the program, and the algorithm picks an-
other program to start proposing. If the candidate is matched, the algo-
rithm checks if they would prefer the proposing program over their currently
matched program. If they prefer the proposing program, then their previous
match is annulled and they are matched tentatively with the proposer, and
their previous partner is added back to the proposing pool. The algorithm
continues until all program positions have been filled.
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4. Resident matching with no costs
Consider the general resident matching setup with N applicants, P pro-
grams with each program having s1, ..., sP available spots, such that there
is a total of S =
∑p
i=i si available spots. In the current process, the appli-
cants apply to the programs, and are then either invited for an interview
or rejected. The applicants then rank the programs in strict ordinal order
in terms of their preference. On the other side, the programs also rank
the applicants, specifically their invited interviewees in ordinal preference
as well. Finally, applicants’ and programs’ rank lists are matched using a
stable-marriage algorithm favouring the applicant.
First, we show that in the current resident matching process it is optimal
for applicants to rank as many as programs as possible when there is no cost
to playing the ranking game. We prove this by induction starting with a
sub-game with one applicant, A, and one program α, at the ranking stage
of the resident matching process. Then the actions of the applicant for this
sub-game are either rank or not rank the program and vice versa for the
program. The payout scenario is shown below:
Applicant A
Program α
rank not rank
rank fA(rAα,M), gα(ραA,M) fA(rAα,M), 0
not rank 0, gα(ραA,M) 0, 0
This two-by-two payout table has applicant actions as rows and program
actions columns. The payout is a 2-tuple of applicant payout and program
payout in that order.
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Clearly, if neither ranked the other then the payoff for both is zero. Not
ranking in this sub-game is equivalent to non-participation. Let rAα denote
the rank applicant A assigned program α. Similarly, let ραA be the rank
program α gave applicant A. Next let fA and gα denote the payout functions
of applicant A and program α respectively. For clarity, the payout fA of the
candidate is a function of the candidate’s rank of the program, denoted rAα,
and the match status M = (0, 1). Conversely, the payout gα of the program is
function of the program’s rank of the applicant, denoted ραA, and the match
status M = (0, 1). The payout functions should increase monotonically with
decreasing rank of match, as the participants’ payouts should increase when
they match with more preferred partners:
r ∈ Z+ (1)
M ∈ (0, 1) (2)
f :(Z+, (0, 1))→ R (3)
g :(Z+, (0, 1))→ R (4)
If r2 > r1, (5)
then f(r1,M) ≥ f(r2,M), (6)
and g(r1,M) ≥ g(r2,M) (7)
Next note the match status M = (0, 1), represents whether the participant
matched (1) or not (0). Thus, the payouts can also be written as:
fA(rAα,M) = fA(rAα,M = 0) + fA(rAα,M = 1) (8)
gα(ραA,M) = gα(ραA,M = 0) + gα(ραA,M = 1) (9)
Clearly, if the participant matched, M = 1, then the payout is positive, as
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they found a partner. If they did not match, M = 0, their payout is at
worst zero, as their status has not changed and they have not lost anything
by participating in the current game, where there are no participation costs.
However, it is possible that the payouts are non-negative even if a match did
not occur. For example, in the one student and one program sub-game, the
applicant or program might find it rewarding to know if the counter-party
ranked them or not. In practice, the payout for this information discovery
should be intuitively much lower than for matching. In this sub-game, if
both the applicant and program ranked each other, they will be matched
under the stable-marriage algorithm; M = 1 for both. However, if only side
ranked the other there will be no match under the stable-marriage algorithm;
M = 0. Therefore the payout table simplifies to:
applicant A
program α
rank not rank
rank fA(rAα,M = 1), gα(ραA,M = 1) fA(rAα,M = 0), 0
not rank 0, gα(ραA,M = 0) 0, 0
Thus, for the one applicant and one program sub-game, the highest payout
is achieved when both rank each other, as fA(rAα,M = 1) ≥ fA(rAα,M =
0) ≥ 0 and gα(ραA,M = 1) ≥ gα(ραA,M = 0) ≥ 0 .
Next, suppose the sub-game was extended to have two programs, α and
β, but still one participant A. Then there will be two payout tables. First,
there is the payout table for applicant A and program α:
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Applicant A
Program α
rank not rank
rank fA(rAα,M), gα(ραA,M) fA(rAα,M), 0
not rank 0, gα(ραA,M) 0, 0
Then there is the payout for A versus program β
Applicant A
Program β
rank not rank
rank fA(rAβ,M), gβ(ρβA,M) fA(rAβ,M), 0
not rank 0, gβ(ρβA,M) 0, 0
The difference in payouts between this game and the previous game 4 is that
there is no guarantee the applicant and a program match even if they rank
each other. The total applicant payout is the sum of applicant payouts for
each program:
fA = max [fA(rAα,M), 0] + max [fA(rAβ,M), 0] ≥ 0 (10)
The payout in (10) is the maximum of a non-negative payout function and
zero depending on whether the applicant ranked a program or not. Clearly,
the applicant should rank both programs no matter what the programs do.
Furthermore, when the applicant ranks both programs, Equation (10) can
be expanded as:
fA = fA(rAα,M = 0) + fA(rAα,M = 1) + fA(rAβ,M = 0) + fA(rAβ,M = 1)
(11)
Then if neither program ranked the applicant, this simplifies to:
fA = fA(rAα,M = 0) + fA(rAβ,M = 0) ≥ 0 (12)
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Next, if either program α or β but not both ranked applicant A, then A will
match with the program that ranked A. Without loss of generality suppose
only A’s less preferred program β ranked A, then the payout is:
fA = fA(rAα,M = 0) + fA(rAβ,M = 1) ≥ (12) ≥ 0 (13)
Since, fA(rAβ,M = 1) > fA(rAβ,M = 0)
Finally, if both programs ranked A, A would match the more preferred pro-
gram α and the payout is:
fA = fA(rAα,M = 1) + fA(rAβ,M = 0) ≥ (13) ≥ 0 (14)
Since, fA(rAα,M = 1) ≥ fA(rAβ,M = 1)
and, fA(rAα,M = 0) ≥ fA(rAβ,M = 0)
Clearly, the applicant achieves the highest payout by ranking both programs
while holding the actions of the programs constant.
For the programs the payouts are max [gα(ραA,M), 0] and max [gβ(ρβA,M), 0]
respectively. Then the optimal for the programs is to rank the applicant, be-
cause in the worst case they do not match but gα(ραA,M = 0) ≥ 0 and
gβ(ρβA,M = 0) ≥ 0.
Next, consider the more common case in resident matching where ap-
plicants outnumber program spots. For this scenario, consider the subgame
with two applicants A and B and one program α. This is similar to the game
with one applicant and two programs. The difference is that the payouts of
the applicants are:
fA = max [fA(rAα,M), 0] ≥ 0
fB = max [fB(rBα,M), 0] ≥ 0 (15)
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Again both applicants will achieve higher payout by ranking versus not rank-
ing the program, no matter what the program or the other applicant does.
Similarly, program α’s payout is:
fA = max [gα(ραA,M), 0] + max [gα(ραB,M), 0] ≥ 0 (16)
Clearly, the program achieves higher payout by ranking both applicants.
Then the program either does not match at all when neither applicant ranked
program or it matches one of the applicants. All these scenarios have payouts
no worse than not ranking either applicant.
We can extend the subgames to include more applicants and programs.
In general, when there are N applicants and P programs, the payout of
applicant i’s is:
fi =
P∑
p=1
max [fi(rip,M), 0] ≥ 0 (17)
Every term of the summation in Equation (17) corresponds to the payoff for
ranking a program. Clearly, since every term is non-negative it is better for
applicant i to always rank a program. Therefore for applicant i, there is
a pure strategy where he or she ranks all the programs that maximizes his
or her payout. Similarly, since the payouts for the other applicants j 6= i,
are similar to Equation (??), the other applicants will also maximize their
payout by ranking all programs.
In practice, most applicants and programs will not match against each
other so that the pairwise payoff for applicant i and program p is likely
fi(rip,M = 0), gi(ρpi,M = 0). Next note that under the stable-marriage
Gale-Shapley algorithm [3] , applicants will match with their highest ranked
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program that also preferred them to other candidates, until the number of
spots at the programs are filled. So for applicants that matched there will
be a payoff tuple with M = 1, e.g. fi(rip,M = 1), gi(ρpi,M = 1).
Now consider the program payouts. The payout for a program ι is:
gι =
N∑
i=1
max [gι(ριi,M), 0] ≥ 0 (18)
Just like the applicant case, it is optimal for program ι to rank all applicants.
By the same logic, it is optimal for all programs to rank all applicants.
Therefore, in a framework where applicants and programs can take the
actions a) rank or b) not rank without incurring any costs, it is optimal for
the applicants and programs to rank every potential partner. They should
rank a potential partner even if there is no guarantee that that partner ranked
them. Of course, this framework with no costs is unrealistic in the following
ways:
1. There is full knowledge all potential partners. This may be true for
medical students knowing all potential residency programs, but the
converse is not true. Clearly, residency programs only know the stu-
dents that applied to their program.
2. Not all applicants apply to all programs because of i) costs of applica-
tions or ii) payoff of matching with certain programs is 0.
3. There is an interview process where applicants and programs identify
more likely partners. This interview process serves as mutual signalling,
but has high costs.
In the next section 5, we consider the optimality of ranking and not ranking
with costs.
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5. Resident matching with costs
As we showed in the previous section 4, it is always better to rank. There
are no costs to ranking for an applicant. They can rank all potential resi-
dencies online. However, the applicant ranks only have reasonable potential
payoff if the counterparty likely ranked them. For example, if an applicant
ranked a program that they did not even apply to, there is almost no chance
that the program ranked the applicant as they would not be aware of the
applicant’s existence. Similarly, an applicant can rank a program that they
applied to but were rejected for interview. Again it is unlikely, the program
ranked a rejected applicant or at least not likely that they ranked a rejected
applicant highly enough that they potentially matched. Therefore, to in-
crease the odds of a better potential match and thereby potential payoff, an
applicant should increase the odds of being ranked by the programs. They
can start by applying to as many programs as possible, resources permitting.
The application cost is a step-wise function of the number of programs ap-
plied, Ophthalmology application costs. These costs range from $60 for the
first ten programs to $35 per program after 40 programs. After an applicant
passes the first round filter and is invited for an in-person interview, there
are the costs of attending interviews. This cost will vary depending on the
applicant home city and the program city. Finally, every applicant will have
different monetary and time budgets for the whole application and interview
process.
Incorporating these costs and budgets into a generic applicant i’s payout
14
in Equation (17):
fi =
qi∑
p=1
(Ep(fi(rip,M)]− A(p)) (19)
Ep[fi(rip,M)] =(p(Ip = 1)× E[fi(rip,M)|Ip = 1]− E[Cp])+
p(Ip = 0)× E[fi(rip,M)|Ip = 0] (20)
subject to
qi∑
p=1
(p(Ip = 1)E[Cp] + A(p)) ≤ Bi
and
qi∑
p=1
tp ≤ Ti
Equation (19) states that the payout of the whole process for applicant i
is the sum of the expected payoff for applying to qi programs. The payout
for applying to the pth program is the expected payout Ep[fi(rip,M)] mi-
nus the cost of application A(p). The term A(p) is the cost for applying to
the pth program and is a deterministic step function in resident matching.
The expectated payoff of applying to the pth program (20) is the payoff for
being accepted for an interview, p(Ip = 1), multiplied the expected payoff
for attending the interview, E[fi(rip,M)|Ip = 1], minus the expected cost
of attending the interview E[Cp] plus the payout if not accepted for inter-
view. The number of applications and interviews applicant i can pay for is
constrained by the monetary budget Bi and the time budget Ti.
First, we analyse the effect of applying to programs. Each term in Equa-
tion (20) consists of the probability of being accepted for an interview, and
the expected payoff being ranked by program if interviewed or not inter-
viewed. We use Bayesian payoffs to estimate the payoff given empirical data
[5]. The probability of matching is incremental with each extra interview
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Figure 1: Cumulative probability of matching for number of times applicant was ranked
increasing the probability of matching to a program. The empirical cumu-
lative distribution of matching for an applicant in Ophthalmology given the
number of interviews is given in Figure 1. The probability of being accepted
for an interview is approximately 1/7 ≈ 14% in SF Match data. Now the cost
for applying to all 116 Ophthalmology programs in 2019 is $3170. Applying
to all 116 programs is expected to yield 16.6 interviews. The cost per inter-
view was estimated to be $404. The total cost of applying to all and then
attending the 16.6 expected interviews is $9,865. This pales in comparison to
the estimated annual average income of $366,000 for an ophthalmologist in
2019 [2], and an expected career income of over $10,000,000, even discounted
for present value. The only thing that should stop applicants applying to all
programs is current budget constraints, but $9,865 should not be the limiting
factor for most applicants given the overall cost of medical education. This
is borne out by the trend in applications in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Average number of applications and interviews over time
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